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In 1997-8, five East Asian countries - Indonesia , Malaysia , 
Soulli Korea , the Philippines , and Thailand - experienced sharp 
currency and ban잉ng crises. The contraction of reaJ GDP was 
severe in relation to the previous history and in comparison 
with five East Asian countries that were Iess affected by the 
financiaI crisis. Recoveries in the five countries were strong in 
some cases, but it is uncIear whether the pre-crisis growth rates 
wiIl be reattained. Indications for permanentIy depressed pros-
pects come from the sharp reductions in investment ra디os ， 
which have recovered only slightIy , and the Iowered stock-
market prices. A panel analysis for a broad group of economies 
shows that a combined currency and b밍lking crisis typically 
reduces economic growth over a five-year period by 2% per year 
The East Asian experience ovel 야1e 1997 -8 crisis is in general 
consistent with this stylized pattem. The broader analysis found 
no evidence that financial crises had effects on gro、Nth that 
persisted beyond a five-year pe디。d 
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JEL Class댄cation: 04 , 01 , F4 
1. Introduction 
The Asian financial crisis began with the floating of the Thai 
baht in ,July 1997. The crisis then spread rapidly to the Philippine 
peso and the Malaysian ringgit. In August, the Indonesian rupiah 
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devalued. ultimately by more than any other Asian currency. 
Rela다vely small depreciations occurred in the Singaporean dollar. 
staπing in August, and the New Taiwan dollar. starting in October. 
The South Korean won depreciated substantially staπing in 
November. Japan also had a moderate devaluation between July 
1997 and January 1998. No significant devaluations took place in 
China. which has remained relatively insulated from world financial 
markets. and Hong Kong. which maintained a currency board 
linked to the U.S. dollar. 
This study focuses on 야le immediate and long-term effects of the 
Asian financial crisis on economic performance in East Asia. 
Specifically. we consider the behavior of economic gro\\πh and 
investment in China. Hong Kong. Indonesia. Japan. South Korea. 
Malaysia. the Philippines. Singapore. Taiwan. and πlailand. 
These ten economies break down naturally into two groups 
depending on the extent to which they were impacted by the 
financial crisis of 1997-8. The first group of five countries 
Indonesia. South Korea. Malaysia. the Philippines. and Thailand 
experienced nominal currency depreciations of more than 50 
percent from July 1997 to early 1998. In these countries. offshore 
nominal interest rates (determined primarily by forward exchange 
rates) or onshore rates reached at least 25 percent at some point 
between June 1997 and January 1998. Subsequent1y. we refer to 
this group as Asian-crisis countries. The other five East Asian 
economies experienced nominal depreciations of less than 25 
percent. and nominal interest rates remained below 20 percent. 1 
One objective is to assess whether the Asian financial crisis had 
a long lasting effect on growth prospects and other dimensions of 
economic performance for the two groups of Asian economies. This 
task is difficult because only limited data are available after the 
ends of the financial crises in 1998. However. we get some 
information first by looking at post-crisis behavior within the group 
of East Asian economies. second by imbedding this behavior within 
a panel analysis of a large number of economies. and finally by 
using the panel to take a broader view of the impact of currency 
crises. 
'Offshore interest rates in late 1997 reached 18 percent in Hong Kong 
and 17 percent in Singapore. Meanin멍ill data on interest rates are 
unavailable for China. but the official exchange rate remained 찌rtually 
unchanged 
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Figure 1 shows the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP 
for each of the East Asian economies from 1960 to 2002. 2 The 
sharp economic contractions in 1998 for the five Asian-crisis 
countries are evident: real per capita GDP (as the purchasing-power 
adjusted value) fell by 12 percent in Indonesia. 11 percent in 
Thailand. and 10 percent in South Korea. but only 3 percent in the 
Philippines and 1 percent in Malaysia. 3 The other five East Asian 
economies were less affected: per capita gro\\πh during 1998 was 
9 percent in Hong Kong. - 4 percent in Singapore. - 2 percent in 
Japan. 4 percent in Taiwan. and !;i percent in China. 
In 1999-2000. economic recovenes occurred. and the per capi1a 
growth rates were posi디ve in all ten economies. Among the fi、 e
crisis countries. the annualized p(‘r capita growth rates were 8 per 
cent in South Korea. 4 percent in Thailand. 3 percent in Malaysia 
and the Philippines. and 2 percent in Indonesia. For the other fi、 e 
economies. the rates were 7 percent in China and Singapore. 5 
percent in Hong Kong and Taiwan ‘ and 1 percent in Japan. 
A central issue is whether the l':ast Asian economies will be able 
to return to the pre-crisis trend rate of growth. It is not clear if tt:e 
recoveries. in the post-crisis period signal a return to the previot;.s 
pattems of growth for the crisis-hit East Asian economies. In fact. 
the rebound of growth for 1999-2000 slowed down in ttle 
subsequent period. In 2001-2. the annualized per capita grow1h 
rates were 4 percent in South Korea. 3 percent in Thailand. 2 
percent in Indonesia and the Philippines. and 0 percent in 
Malaysia. 
ιThe underlying GDP data are the purchasing-power adjusted values froπl 
Penn-World Tables 6.1. as described in Surnmers and Heston (1 991) and 
Heston. Summers. and Aten (2002). We updated the Surnmers-He않ston dalι) 
for 2001 and 2002 by using information on real GDP from the Intemational 
Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook. 
3According to the Penn-World Tables 6. 1, per capita GDP growth rate m 
1998 was - 0.6% for Malaysia. This estimate based on the PPP adjusted 
GDP series seems too low. For instance. the conventional national account 
data from the IMF source was • 9.70;,). For other East Asian countries. 야le 
discrepancies between two sources are less significant. 







UJ ‘_, - _, _.-... _ ............. _ ... _ .... _ ..... , .............. ~"'_.， .. " .............. _.-‘--_.~ ..... ' ................ _-‘_ ........... -.... … ... _ .... " ... _ .... -._- ‘ ...... , ...... -’ 















-tlJ ‘- .. _-_.--- -_, ._ .... _ ....... ........ __ ._~._._ ..... _--_. _ ....-... -._.-...... _ .. __ ...... _----_ .... _ ... __ .. _ --_._.~"， 
Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP in MaJaysia 


























0.15 ’ .. __ ._ ............. , . .1 
Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP in China 
87 








Growtb Rate of Per Capita GDP in Hong Kong 




‘ 0 .1 
‘ 010 
.’l ’ 








Growtb Rate of Per Capita GDP in Singapore 








Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP in Taiwan 
FIGURE 1 
Thus. it looks likely that the financial crisis in 1997 -8 h a.d 
persisting effects on grow단1. However. the subsequent downturTI 
over the period 2001-2 may have come from the global recession. 
During the same period. the non -crisis East Asìan economies also 
experienced a drastic r.외1 in per capita grow야1 rates: the annualized 
per capita gro、짜h rates were - 2 percent in Singapore and 0 
percent in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Furthermore. even without tbe 
Asian financial crisis. projected growth rates in East Asia would 
have differed from historical ones. paπly because the various 
economies had become so much richer than they were in 1960. 
Therefore. the ques디on is whether gro、Nt.h forecasts would revert 1.0 
those that would have been made before the Asian financial crisi::;. 
The subsequent analysis quanti.fi.es these growth pr이ec디ons and 
tries to reach some conclusions about the long-term outlook. 
B. Investment Ratios 
Figure 2 depicts 삼1e investment ratios for the East Asian 
econornies from 1960 to 2002. 4 Four of the Asian-crisis counmes -
송fhe ratios are for real investment (private plus public) relative to re꾀 
GDP. The under밴ng data are the purchas1ng-power adjusted values from 
야le Penn-World Table 6. 1. For 2001 and 2002. the values were estimated 
from infonnation on re외 investment and real GDP from the IntemationaJ 
Monetary Fund. WorLd Economic Outlook and the Asian Development Bank. 
Key Indicators oJ Developing Asian and paciflC Countries. These numbeJ's 
were linked to the Penn-World Tables values based on a comparison in the 
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FIGURE 2 
Indonesìa, South Korea, Malaysia, 하ld π1ailand - showed dramati c 
declines in 1998, by well over ten percentage points. For the 
Philippines, which historically had a low investment ratio , the 
reduction in 1998 was comparatively small , amoun디ng to about 2 
percentage points ‘ For the four countries in which investmen.t 
declined sharply, the failure to see substantial recoveries i:n 
1999-2002 suggests that some삼1ing permanent may have occurred.5 
However, it 1s a1so possible that investment ra디os tend gener려ly to 
recover more slowly than rates of economic grow상1 ， and the 
subsequent cross-country 없lalysis supports 삼1is viewpoint. 
The other five East Asian economies e강1ibited milder decreases 
or no decreases in investment ratios during 1998. Hong Kong, 
Japan 하1d Sìngapore had small reductions from their peak ratios., 
r없1밍ng from 2 to 3 percentage points. There was little or n o 
dechne for China 없1d Taiw밍1 . π1US ， there is reason to beheve that 
the dramatic falls in the investment ratios in Indonesia, SoUtll 
Korea , M머aysia， and 까1ailand were specifically related to the Asian 
5Al야lOugh parts of the sharp declines in real investments are attributed 
to the increase in investrnent prices due to currency crashes. there must b년 
other factors that have caused the permanent slump of investment. In 
Korea. for ex없nple. after the nominal exchange depreciation of 40% in 
1997. domestic price of investment goods on average increased by 19% in 
1998. However. since 야len 디1e price continue to have dropped by 13% ove:~ 
the period of 1999-2002. 
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financial crisis. 
C. Stock-Market Prices 
Figure 3 examines pattems in real stock-market prices. πle 
general idea is that a f:벼1 in an economy’s stock market likely 
reflects the market's belief that long-term gro"πh prospects have 
diminished. In the figures , the real stock-market values are 
computed by conveπing loc외 currency values of stock-market 
indexes to U.S. dollars 와ld then di찌ding by a measure of the U .S. 
price leve1.6 An altemative procedure would deflate the local 
currency stock-market indexes by measures of local prices. Shifts 
in real exchange rates cause the two concepts t。 이verge. 
The five Asian-crisis countries saw sharp declines in real 
stock-market valuations from the staπ of the financial crisis in 
summer 1997 until the f:려1 of 1998 (For Thailand , the drop in the 
stock market clearly precedes the financial crisis). For present 
purposes , an important observation is that valuations at the end of 
2002 f:머1 far short of those from early 1997. The ra디os of values 
for December 2002 to those for January 1997 are 0.10 for the 
Philippines , 0.14 for Indonesia. 0.31 for Malaysia, 0.43 for 
Thailand , and 0.65 for South Korea. For the five other East Asian 
economies , the declines in stock-market valuation are less 
dramatic. The ratios of values for December 2002 to those for 
January 1997 are 0.42 for Taiwan, 0.51 for Singapore , 0.55 for 
Japan , 0.63 for Hong Kong, and 1.24 for China. 
Parts of these declines reflect the weak overall stock-market 
performance during 2000-2. The ratios of real stock p디ces index for 
January 2000 to those for January 1997 are 0.28 for Indonesia , 
0.57 for Thailand, 0.82 for the Philippines, 0.46 for Malaysia , and 
1.01 for South Korea. For the five other East Asian economies , the 
ratios for Januaxy 2000 relative to Januarγ 1997 are 1. 12 for 
Taiw윈1 ， 0.88 for Singapore , 1.29 for Japan , 1. 10 for Hong Kong, 
and 1.59 for China. 
δThe stock-market indexes , rep아ted in domestic currency units , were 
converted into U.S. dollars using market exch밍1ge rates. These values were 
converted into real terms by dividing by the U.S. CPI. The natural logs of 
these values were calculated , the values in January 1998 were normalized 
to zero , 하ld 외I values were divided by the natural log of hνo [to obtain 
convenient units for the graph). The resul디ng numbers are plotted in Figure 
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FIGURE 3 
It seems reasonable to infer that the most paπS of the sharper 
declines in real stock market valuation for the Asian-crisis 
countries after the financial crisis of 1997 reflect effects from the 
financial crisis itself.7 
The main conclusion from the analysis of stock-market data is 
that. from the perspec디ve of the financial markets. events from 
1997 야lrough 2002 had permanent negative consequences for the 
economic outlook of the five Asian-crisis countries. The adverse 
impacts were less signific윈lt for the five other East Asian eco-
nomies and were not present for China. The 띠lancial crises 삼lat 
began in summer 1997 were paπ of the environment that would be 
reflected in stock-market prices but were , of course, not the entire 
st아y. However. the differential market responses in the t:\νo groups 
of economies suggest that the financial crises - and. more specifi-
cally, ch하19ing perceptions about the long-term consequences of 
these crises - were signifi않nt parts of the story. 
7Parts of the decllnes in real stock-market values . as measured. reflect 
depreciations of re허 exch없1ge rates. If the re외 stock-market values are 
calculated by dividing nominal stock-market indexes by local consumer 
price indexes, then the ratios for December 2000 to those for January 1997 
are 0.31 for Indonesia. 0.32 for Thailand. 0 .34 for the Philippines. 0 .52 for 
Malaysia. and 0.69 for South Korea. For the other non-crisis Asian 
countries. the ratios are 0.68 for Taiwan. 0.93 for Singapore , 0.76 for 
Japan , 1. 10 for Hong Kong , 없ld 2 .40 for China. 
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III. Cross-Country Analyses of Economic Outcomes 
The general approach in this section is to modity exis디ng work 
on cross-country analyses of economic groV\πh and investment to 
assess the effects of the Asian financial crisis. We begin with a 
study of economic grm까h ， using an empirical framework that has 
been widely used in pre띠ous studies. See , for example , Barro and 
Le(‘ (1 994) , Barro (1 997). and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004 , Ch 
12). Our regression applies to a panel data set of 85 countries over 
seven five-year periods from 1965 to 2000 , corresponding to the 
periods 1965-70, ... and 1995-2000. We include in this analysis a 
representative set of the explanatory variables that have been us건d 
in previous work. Thus , controlling for other important explanatorγ 
variables , any effects of the Asian financial crisis would show up as 
deviations of economic performance during the final five-year 
inteπal from those observed in the earlier intervals. When the data 
are available , it will be interesting to assess persis디ng effects on 
performance in the next five-year period , 2000-5. 
A. Economic Growth 
The framework for deterrnining the groV\떼1 rate of real per capita 
GDP is indicated by the baseline system, shown in column 1 of 
Table 1. Since the general approach has been described elsewhere 
and is likely to be familiar , we include here only a brief discussion. 
The dependent variables are the five-year growth rates of real per 
capita GDP. Estimation is by 야uee-stage least squares , using mo~t­
ly lagged values of the independent variables as instruments - see 
the notes to Table 1. lndividual constant terms are included for 
each period; hence , the system does not explain the evolution of 
world economic growth over time. No country fixed effects are 
introduced , because this procedure tends to eliminate the bulk of 
the information in the data , that is , the cross-sectional dimension 
of 1he panel. 
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TABLE 1 
CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR GROWfH RATES 
Expl없latory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log (per capita GDP) -0.0233 -0 .0242 -0.0240 -0.0227 -0 .0207 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0 .0031) 
Log (total feπillty rate) -0.0178 -0.0167 -0.0166 -0.0168 -0.0157 
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Male upper-level schooling 0 .0018 0.0064 0.0026 0.0017 0 .0015 
(0.0016) (0.0042) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Log (1ife expectancy) 0.0633 0.0651 0 .0649 0.0636 0 .0587 
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0165) 10.0165) 
Govemment consumpt1on/GDP -0 .057 -0 .060 -0 .058 -0 .054 -0 .047 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
Rule-of-law index 0 .0183 0.0177 0.0169 0 .0191 0 .0165 
10.00621 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 10.0060) 
Inflation rate -0.0297 -0.0258 -0.0247 -0.0280 -0.0277 
(0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Democracy index 0 .0460 0.0482 0.0470 0.0452 0.0415 
(0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0 .0161) 
Democracy index Squ강ed -0 .0407 -0.0423 -0 .0418 -0 .0403 -0 .0366 
(0.0149) (0.0148) 10.0148) (0.0148) (0.0149) 
Openness measure 0.0049 0 .0064 0.0071 0 .0052 0 .0031 
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0043) 
[nvestment/GDP 0 .079 0.087 0.089 0 .083 0 .084 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Growth rate of terms of trade 0.033 0.036 0.037 0.033 0.032 
Group of 5 Aslan financlal crtsis 
coun tr1es (dummy for 95-0이 
Group of 5 Other East Aslan 
economies (dummy (or 95-。이 
Group of 5 Aslan fin1 crtsls 
countrles (dummy for other 
pertods) 
Group of 5 Other East Aslan 
econ omies (dummy for other 
pertods) 
Number of countr1es 
。bservatlons
(0 .021) (0 .021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
85 
535 
-0 .0234 ‘ 0.0254 -0 .0166 -0 .0158 
(0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
85 
535 
-0.0121 -0 .0048 
(0.009 1) (0.0099) 
85 
535 








Notes: Dependent variables: The depen dent variable i5 야le growth rate of 
real per capita GDP. Data are from the World T a bles 6 . 1. as 
described in Sumrners and Heston (1991) and Heston ‘ Summers. 
and Aten (2002). The grow야1 rate 1s 상le average for each of the 
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seven five-year periods 1965-70 ... , 1995-2000. 
Independent variables: lndi띠dual constants (not shown) are 
included for each period. The log of real per capita GDP and the 
avemge years of male secondm-y and higher sch。이ing are measured 
at the beginning of each period. The log of Iife expect없1Cy at birth is 
며1 average for the previous five years. The ratios of government 
consumption (exc)usive of spending on education and defense) and 
investment (private plus public) to GDP. the inflation rate. the total 
fertHity rate. the democracy inclex. and the gro~πh rate of the terms 
of trade (export over import prices) are period averages. The 
rule-of-Iaw index is the earliest value available (for 1982 or 1985) m 
the first four equa디ons and the period average for the oth‘"r 
equations ‘ The openness measure is the ratio of exports plus imporls 
to GDP. filtered for the estimated effects on this measure of the logs 
of population and area. The t간n East Asian economies are China. 
Hong Kong SAR. lndonesia. Japan. South Korea. Malaysia. the 
Philippines. Singapore. Taiwan. ancl Thailand (China is omitted 
because of missing data). The five Asian-crisis countries are 
lndonesia. South Korea. Malaysia. the Philippines. and Thailand 
Estimation: Estimation is by three-stage least squares. lnstruments 
are the actual values of the schooling. Iife-expectancy. openness ‘ a r..d 
tem1s-of-trade variables; dumrny variables for prior colonial status 
(wh:ich have substantial explanatory power for inflation)); lagg~'d 
values of the log of per capita GDP. the government consurnption 
ratio. and the investment ra디0; and the initial values for each perieod 
of the rule-of-Iaw index and democracy index. The earliest value 
available for the rule-of-Iaw inclex (for 1982 or 1985) is included ,IS 
an :instrument for the first four equatio I1s. and the value at the start 
of each period is included for the other equations. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
The first explanatory variable. the log of per capita GDP at the 
start of each period. reveals the familiar conditional convergence 
effect: the estimated coefficient is - 0.023 (s.e. 二 0.003).8 The log of 
the total fertility rate is significantly negative: - 0.0 18 (0.005). Also 
included are nνo measures of initial human capit머. each of which 
has a posi디ve effect on growth. The coefficient on the log of life 
expectancy at birth is significant. 0.063 (0.017). However. the 
s.:r‘he instrurnent list excludes the log of per capita GDP at the start of 
eact. period but includes earlier values of the log of per capita GDP. If the 
square of the log of per capita GDP is added as an explanatory variable. 
there is some indication that the rate of convergence (the magnitude of the 
marginal effect of the log of per capita GDP on the growth rate) increases 
as an economy gets richer. 
l02 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
educationa1 attainment variable , which is measured by the average 
years of school attainment of m a1es aged 25 and over at the 
secondary 밍ld higher levels is sta디stically insignificant. 0.0018 
(0.0016).9 
The next five variables capture aspects of government p이icies 
and institutions. The ratio of govemment consump디on (measured 
exclusively of outlays on education and defense) to GDP is 
significantly nega디ve. -0.057 (0.022). A subjective measure of the 
extent of maintenance of the rule of law (an indicator of property 
rights enforcement) is significantly positive , 0.018 (0.006). Higher 
inflation. 없1 indicator of macroeconomic instability, is significantly 
negative for growth , - 0.027 (0.008).10 
The regression results confirm the non-linear relationship 
between democracy and growth. as found by Barro (1 997). The 
coefficients on the indicator of democracy and its square terms are 
positive and nega디ve respectively and both coefficients are statisti-
cally significant. The pattem of coefficients indicates that the 
gro'\\πh rate increases with poli디cal freedom at low levels of 
democracy but decreases with democracy once the society has 
attained a ceπ.ain level of political freedom. 
Increased openness to international trade has a posi디ve effect on 
growth. but the estimated coefficient. 0.005 (0.004) is not statisti-
cally significant. 11 
Many of the variables just discussed also affect an economy’S 
propensity to invest. as discussed below. However. given the other 
explanatory variables , a higher ratio of real investment to real GDP 
90ther measures of school attainment lack significant explanatory power 
for economic growth. Barro and Sala-i-Maπin (2004) show that the quality 
of sch。이ing - measured by scores on intemation떠Iy comparable tests of 
educational achievement in the subjects of science and mathematics - is 
statistically significant. However. data on the qu떠ity of schooling cover only 
about 40 countries. 
lιfhe instrument list excludes inflation but includes measures of colonial 
heritage. These colony 、rariables have substantial explanatory power for 
inflation. 
llThe independent variable is the ratio of total trade. expoπs plus 
imports. to GDP filtered for the 양pical effect of country size on this trade 
measure. This last effect was estimated from a system in which the 
trade-GDP ratio over various periods was the dependent variable. Countηf 
size was represented by the logs of population and area. The trade variable 
was included in the instrument list. 
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still has a significantly positive effect on gro\\πh ， as indicated by 
the coeffìcient 0.079 (0.022). Thε inclusion of the lagged , but not 
contemporaneous , investment ratio in the instrument list may allc-w 
a causal interpretation of this effect. A higher gro\\πh rate of the 
terms of trade (export relative to import prices) has also an 
expansionary effect on growth , but the estimated coefficient. 0.0(13 
(0.020), is not statistically significan1. 
Columns 2-5 of Table 1 show the effects on growth in the period 
1995-2000 from dummy 、rariables for being one of the five Asian 
financial crisis countries and from being one of the five other east 
Asian economies. In column 2. the estimated coefficient on the 
dummy variable for the five Asian financial crisis countries for tlle 
period 1995-2000 is significantly negative , -0.023 (0.009) , indi-
cating that the five crisis countries grew during 1995-2000 ‘1t 
about 2. :3 percentage points per year below the rate that wou.d 
otherwise have been predicted by the set of explanatory variables. 
Column 3 of Table 1 adds the dummy variable for the five other 
east Asian economies for the period 1995-2000 ‘ The estimated 
effect of the five Asian financial crisis countries remains similar to 
thaL in column 1. For the five other east Asian economies. the 
estimated coefficient is insignificantly different from zero. - 0.0 12 
(0.009). Thus , only the five crisis-hit Asian economies experienc~:d 
the signifìcant shortfall of gro\\πh in the period 1995-2000 from the 
rate that would have been predicted by the growth regression. 
Column 4 of Table 1 includes Î..wo dummy variables for the fi\'e 
crisis-hit Asian economies- one for the period 1995-2000 , and the 
other for the six other five-year periods (where the coefficient of the 
dummy for these six periods is constrained to be the same for each 
period). The estimated coefficient on the dummy for the period 
1995-2000 is negative and marginally signific밍11， -0.017 (0.01 이， 
whereas the estimated coefficient for the other six periods :s 
significantly positive , 0.011 (0.006). Thus , the five Asian criSlS 
countries had higher growth by about 1. 1 percentage point per year 
in the intervals before 1995 whereas they had lower growth by 
about 1. 7 percentage point per year during 1995-2000 , compared 10 
the rest of the sample in the corresponding period. 
Column 5 adds the corresponding dummy variables - for the 
period 1995-2000 and for the six other five-year periods -- for the 
five othe Jr Asian economies. With these variables included , the 
estimated effects of the five Asian crisis countries are similar to 
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those in co1umn 4; that is. significantly posi디ve for the six other 
five-year periods and marginal1y significantly negative for the peπod 
1995-2000. The estimated coefficient for the five other Asian 
economies for the period 1995-2000 is insignificant. - 0.005 
(0.01이. The estimated coefficient for these economies for the other 
six periods was 0.011 (0.00’7) and is also sta디S디cal1y insignificantly 
different from zero. 
Tab1e 3. co1umns 1 and 2. detai1s the growth shortfall during 
1995-2000 for each of the East Asian economies. Co1umn 1 contains 
the actua1 growth rates of per capita GDP. Co1umn 2 shows the 
estimated va1ues from the baseline system in co1umn 1 of Tab1e 1. 
Note that this system excludes all of the dummy variab1es for the 
East Asian economies. In most cases. the estimated va1ues fall 
substantially short of the historica1 gro\\πh rates. which are shown 
for 1965-95 in co1umn 3 of Tab1e 3. The main reason for these 
shortfalls is that most of the economies have become much richer 
over time , and the convergence effect predicts a reduction in growth 
rates. This effect is par디al1y offset by the generally favorab1e and , 
more pertinently, improving nature of the other exp1anatory 
variab1es that determine economic growth in the system sho\\π1 ln 
co1umn 1 of Tab1e 1 (The values of the exp1anatOlγ variables for 
the East Asian economies are shown in Tab1e 4). However , the net 
effect is to predict growth rates below the historica1 average for 
most of the East Asian economies. These lowered gro\\πh 
projections wou1d also app1y for future periods and wou1d have 
applied even in the absence of the Asian financial crisis. 
As an example. for South Korea. the model’s estimated gro\\πh 
rate of per capita GDP for 1995-2000 is only 3.7 percent per year , 
compared with the 6.7 percent average gro\\πh rate experienced for 
1965-95. 12 The mode1 predicts similar retardations of gro\\πh for the 
other pre띠ously high growing East Asian economies: Hong Kong is 
lιfhis estimated growth rate for South Korea in 1995-2000 exceeds the 
average value in the sample (0.022) by 0.015. This deviation from the 
sample mean can be broken down intro contributions from the ten 
explanatory variables shown in Tables 3 and 4. The results , all expressed 
as deviations from the sample mean , are as follows: ~ 0.017 for the log of 
per capita GDP, 0.005 for schooling , 0.004 for government consumption. 
0.001 for life expectancy, ~0.002 for democracy. ~0.001 for the terms of 
trade , 0.000 for the rule of law, 0.000 for openness , 0.007 for fertility. 
0.001 for inflation. and 0.013 for investment 
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4.2 percεnt versus 5.4 percent, Singapore is 5.0 percent versus 6.6 
percent. Taiwan is 2.6 percent versus 6.7 percent. and Thailancl is 
4.6 percent versus 5.4 percent. The cutback for Japan , 2.9 percent 
versus 4.1 percent. is also notable. The only economy in which a 
growth slowclown was not projectecl is the Philippines. which has 
3.2 percent versus 1.0 percent. However , the main element in this 
case is the greatly disappointin당 growth performance during the 
19G5-95 period. 
A comparison of the actual gro씨rth rates for 1995-2000 with the 
model’ s estimates shows that two of the East Asian countries 
actually exceeded expecta디ons. These are China. for which the 
actual growth rate of 5.7 percenlι beat the model estimate of 4 2 
percent. and Taiwan. for which the actual value of 4.8 percent was 
wel1 above the estimate of 2.6 percent. The other eight countries 
showed shortfalls of varying sizes. including gaps of 4.3 percent per 
year for Thailand and 4.1 percent per year for Hong Kong. 
B. Investment Ratios 
Table 2: contains the results from cross-country estimation of the 
determinants of the ratio of real investment (public plus private) 10 
real GDP. The dependent variables are the averages of the invest-
ment rat:ios over the seven five-、year periods 1965-9 , ... 1995-9. 
The specification follows the form of Table 1. except that the 
contemporaneous investment raüo is replaced in the group ()f 
explanatory variables by the lagged value of this ratio. Since the 
investment ratio displays a high degree of serial dependence , th1S 
lagged depenclent variable has a lot of explanatory power. In the 
equations shown in Table 2. the estimated coefficient of this 
variable is in the neighborhood of 0.7 and is highly significant. 13 
From the perspective of a partial-a이ustment model. the investment 
ra디1) can be viewed as adjus디ng about 30 percent of the way over 
a f1ve-year period to the target value determined by the other 
explanatory 、rariables in the system. 
The baseline model in column 1 of Table 2 shows a significantly 
negative effect on the investment ratio from the initial level of pt'f 
capita GDP. The initial quantities of human capital in the forms ()f 
13In contrast , if a lagged dependent vmiable is added to the system for 
the growth rate in Table 1. column 1. the estimated coefficient diflers 
insi망1ificantly from zero. 
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TABLE 2 
CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR INVESTMENT RATIOS 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged raUo lo investment to 0.711 0.712 0.712 0 .721 0 .072 
GDP (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log (per cap!ta GDP) -0.0082 -0.0086 -0 .0086 -0.0062 -0.0049 
(0‘ 0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
냐g (total ferUlity rate) -0 .0178 -0.0 178 -0 .0177 -0 .0131 -0 .0113 
(0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
Male upper-level schooling 0 .0028 0.0029 0 .0028 0 .0021 0.0018 
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Log (Ufe expectancy) 0.065 0.064 0.064 0 .067 0.064 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.0 19) (0.019) 
Govemment consumpUon/GDP -0.062 -0 .063 -0.063 -0.066 -0.061 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Rule-of-Iaw index 0.0204 0.0202 0 .0201 0 .0208 0.0192 
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0 .0082) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
lnflaUon rate 0 .0002 -0.0004 -0 .0007 0.0040 0 .0028 
(0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0090) (0.0089) 
Democracy index 0.0259 0 .0253 0 .0254 0 .0146 0 .0143 
(0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0201) 
Democracy index -0 .0240 -0.0229 -0 .0226 -0.0140 -0 .0123 
Squared (0.0 19이 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0188) 
Openness measure 0 .0189 0 .0197 0.0195 0 .0173 0.0151 
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
Growth rale of lerms of trade 0.076 0.077 0 .076 0.077 0.074 
Group of 5 Aslan fi.nancial cr!sls 
countries (dummy for 95-0이 
Group of 5 Otl1er EasL Asian 
economles (dummy for 95-00) 
Group of 5 Aslan fin'l crisls 
countrles (dummy for other 
periods) 
Group of 5 Other Easl Asian 
economies (dummy for other 
perlods) 
Number of countries 
ObservaUons 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
85 
535 
-0.0137 -0.0131 -0.0210 -0 .0186 















Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of real investment (private p lus 
public) to real GDP. Data are from the World Tables 6.1. The 
m easure used is the average of the ra디o over the seven p eriods 
1965-9. . .. 1995-9. The lagged value of the ìnves tInent ratio is 삼le 
average of 비e ratio over 야le pre여ous interval. See the notes to Table 
1 for other information. 
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education and life expectancy have positive coefficients , though the 
one on education is margin머ly significant. The fertility rate has a 
significantly negative effect. 
In terms of the policy variables , the main results are negative 
effects from government consumption and significantly positive 
effects from the rule of law and international openness. The 
inflation rate has an insigni“cant effect. The effect from democracy 
is non-linear: the estimated coefficient on the linear term is 
positive. and that on the square 0 1' democracy is nega디ve. 
However , neither coefficient is statistically significant. Changes in 
the terms of trade have a significantly positive effect. 
Columns 2-6 add dummy variables for the five Asian-crisis 
countries and the five other East Asian countries. The results show 
that , for given values of the other explanatory 、rariables ， the 
investment ratios in the five Asian-crisis countries were significantly 
higher by about 3 percentage points than the rest of the sample in 
the intervals before 1995-9. However. these investment ratios 
became significantly lower by about 2 percentage points in Ule 
1995-9 period. In contrast, for the five other East Asian economies , 
the investment ratios did not deviate significantly from those 
elsewhere in the periods before 1995-9 or in the 1995-9 period. 
Thus , the Asian-crisis countries cliffered from the other East Asian 
economies not only in terms of the adverse shocks to investment in 
the recent period but also in the sense of having abnormally high 
investment ratios at earlier times ‘ 
Table 3 gives details about the actual and estimated investment 
ratios in the East Asian economies for the period 1995-9. Column 
1 pres않ent않s the actual investmen따lt r떠a디o떠s. Column 2 shows the 
estimated values from the baseline syste히m in column 1 of T、'ab비le :2 
Amon명g the five A뻐s외ia뻐n-c띠r디isis count띠r디ies ， only M외aysia had an 
investment ratio above the estimated value (by one percenta앙e 
pointl. For the other four crisis economies , 삼le actual ratios f{ ‘ II 
short of the estimated ratios. Thailand showed the largest negative 
gap of five percentage points ancl the other crisis economies had 
nega디ve gaps ranging from one to two percentage points. ln 
contrast, for the five other East Asian economies , most of the gaps 
were posltive , with the largest being plus two percentage points for 
Singapore. 
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TABLE 3 
GROwrH AND INVESTMENT lN EAST AslAN ECONOMIES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Economy Growth EsUrnated Growth Jnvestment EsUmated Jnvestment 
rate growth rate. rate ratio Investment raUo 
1995-2000 1995-2000 1960-95 1995-99 ratio. 1995-9 1990-4 
Jndonesia 0.000 0.022 0.047 0.184 0.188 0.124 
South Korea 0.032 0 .037 0 .067 0.346 0.353 0 .287 
Malaysia 0.026 0 .033 0.042 0 .283 0.271 0 .199 
Phillppines 0.025 0.032 0.010 0.155 0 . 171 0.149 
Thailand 0 ‘ 003 0.046 0.054 0.305 0.357 0.310 
China 0.057 0.042 0 .043 0.219 0.209 0 . 157 
Hong Kong 0.008 0.042 0 .054 0.283 0 .285 0.245 
Japan 0.012 0.029 0 .041 0.315 0 .307 0 .320 
Slngapore 0.029 0 .047 0 .066 0.421 0 ‘ 406 0 .440 
Taiwan 0.048 0 .026 0.067 0.217 0 .216 0 .179 
Full sample 
0.022 0 .022 0 .022 0 .178 0. 178 0 . 181 (67 counUiesJ 
Notes: The gro、wth rate refers to rea1 per capita GDP. The estimated grow다1 
rate for 1995-2000 is from the p윈lel regression shown in Table 1. 
column l. The estimated va1ue for the investment ratio for 1995- 9 is 
from the panel regression shown in Table 2. column 1. 
C. General E.ffects oJ Fïnancial Crises 
The method이O잉r employed thus far is useful for assessing the 
contemporaneous effects of the Asian financia1 crisis on gro、따h and 
investment for the Asian-crisis countries and for other East Asian 
economies. When data [or 2000- 5 and beyond become available , the 
methodology could a1so be appUed to assess whether e[fects from 
the Asian financial crisis persisted beyond the contemporaneous 
fíve-year inteπ외. 
Another approach , pursued by Park 없ld Lee (2002) and Barro 
(2001) , is to regard the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 not as a 
unique event but rather as an example of a broader class of crises 
that have affected numerous countries. The cross-coun다y regres-
sion framework can be used to assess 암le contemporaneous and 
persisting influences of the universe of currency crises on economic 
(;ROWTH AND lNVESTMENT lN EAST ASIA }09 
outcome상. The results from this exercise can then be extrap이ated 
to the case of the Asian financial crisis. In this way. inferences can 
be made about the las디ng economic effects of this crisis without 
Wa:L디ng for additional data to materialize. 
To get a broader international perspective on currency crises. we 
first need to define what a currency crisis is. A typical approach. 
f이lowing Frankel and Rose. (1 996). is to iden디ty the dates of crises 
with lar당e nominal deprecia디ons of a country’s currency over a 
short period. However. severe spεculative pressure does not always 
lead to large depreciations when the authorities successfully defend 
the currency by inteπening in the foreign exchange market. 
Hence. Eichengreen. Rose. 없ld Wyplosz (1 995) and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) use an alternative indicator of currency pressure by 
combining depreciation rates wi.th additional variables such as 
foreign reserve losses and domestic interest rates. Then. a currency 
crisis is considered to have occurred if the composite indicatJr 
increased. above a threshold level in terms of the country-speciJìc 
moments. 
In our analysis. we combine the two approaches. We define a 
currency crisis as an episode identified. by either the former αr 
latter approach. For the former approach. as in Park and Lee 
(2002) and Barro (2001). we define a currency crisis as a circum-
stance in which the nominal der:’recia디。n of the currency was at 
least 25 percent during any quarter of the year and exceeded by at 
least 10 percentage points the depreciation of the currency in the 
previous quarter. In order to apply the criterion in the laU.~r 
approach. we construct the indicator of currency pressure by a 
weighted average of monthly nominal depreciation rate and monthly 
percenta딛e change of foreign reseπe. with weights such that the 
two components of the indicator have an equ혀 size in terms of 
sample volatilities. A currency crisis is then identified to have 
occurred in the specific year when the change in the indicator αf 
currency pressure for any month of that year exceeded three 
standard deviations above the mean of the indicator over the 
sample pe디od for each country. provided that either the monthly 
nominal depreciation rate or percentage change of reseπe loss 
exceeds 10 percent. 14 
I<We impose the condition of the monthly nominal depreciation rate or 
percentage change of reseπe loss exceeding 10 percent. Otherwise. there 
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We apply a wïndow of three years to isolate independent crises. 
That is. a currency crisis occurring in that year or three years 
followïng the initial crisis is counted as a continuation of the same 
crisis rather than a new episode. Applying 야1Ïs procedure. we 
identifY 260 independent currency crises for 130 countries over the 
period from 1970 to 1999. According to these criteria. the five 
Asian-crisis countries all experienced currency crises in 1997. 
We defined a cuπency-crisiS dummy variable for each countrγ 
during any fìve-year period to equal one if a crisis occurred during 
the period and to take on the value zero otherwise. 15 We con-
sidered the contemporaneous effects of this variable on economic 
gro\\πh and investrnent. and we also looked for effects from the 
presence of a currency crisis in the previous five-year period. 
The Asian financial crises were not only currency crises but also 
involved severe distress for banking systems. To get a broad 
measure of b밍lking crises. we followed the approach of Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) and Eichengreen and Rose (1 998). These authors 
define a banking crisis as a situation in which bank failures or 
suspensions led to the exhaustion of much or all of bank capital. 
The data on b하lking crises are complied from Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1 996). Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1 997). and Glick 
and Hutchison (2001). The resul디ng data apply from 1970 to 1998. 
We also use a wïndow of three years to isolate independent crises. 
According to these data. the five Asian-crisis countries all expe-
rienced banking crises during 1997-8. 
might occur a potenti외 problem such that the expected number of crises 
would be the same for all countries. if the form of the distribution were 
equ떠ly normal but the mean 뻐d standard deviations varied across 
countries. 
ISWe used the interval 1970-4 for cuπency devaluation to coπespond to 
growth for 1970-5 없ld to the average investment ratio for 1970-4 and 
similarly for the other periods. As an altemative procedure. we defined the 
if 야le crisis occurred in the first year of the five-year interval. 0.8 if the 
crisis occurred in the second year. and so on. This approach might be 
preferable if the effect of a currency crisis tended to persist at least for 
several years. However. this altemative approach generated a poorer fit to 
the data. especially on economic growth. This finding suggests that the 
effects of currency crises on economic outcomes are short lived. 
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TABLE 4 
E XPLANATORY V ARlABLES FOR EAST AS lAN E CONOMIES 
Ecαoπnomy 
lndonesia 








































































Log (life Govcrnmcnl 
expeclancy) consumplíon/ 
l995 GDP 1995-n 
4 . 18 0 . 10 
4 .26 0 .0 1 
4.27 0 .09 
4 .22 0 . 11 
4.26 0 .06 
4 .27 0 , 17 
4.36 0 .03 
4.37 0 .03 
4.31 0 .0 1 
4 .31 0 .05 















(6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ru le of Law Inflalíon ratc Democracy 
1995-9 1995-2000 1995-9 
0 .57 0. 16 0. 13 
0.73 0 .04 0.83 
0 .77 0.03 0.43 
0 .67 0 .07 0.83 











































0 .73 0.08 0 .7 1 
Openness Gro\Vlh of 
measure lerms of Lradr 
l995-9 1995-2000 
0 . 19 0 .035 
0 .02 -0.047 
1.26 0 .000 
0 .37 0 .052 
0 .34 0 .006 
0 .18 0 .000 
1.68 0 .004 
-0 .37 -0.0 ) 8 
2.04 -0.004 
0 . 13 0 .009 
-0 .02 -0 .01 1 
Notes: Per capita GDP ìs the PPP a djusted value ln 1996 U.S. dollars 
Upper-level schoolìng is the average years of a ttainme n t of males 
aged 25 없ld over in secondary a nd high e r edu cation. Li fe 
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expectancy is at age 1. The total fertility rate is the number of live 
births for the average woman over her expected lifetime. The 
govemment consump디on variable is the Summers-Heston ratio of 
real government consump디on to GDP less the ratios for public 
spending on defense and education. The rule-of-law index. expressed 
on a zero-to-one scale. with one the most favorable. is based on the 
indicator from International Countrν Risk Guide for the maintenance 
of the rule of law. The inflation rate is the gro\\πh rate over each 
period of a consumer price index. The democracy index. expressed 
on a zero-to-one scale. with one the most favorable ‘ is based on the 
indicator of politic외 rights compiled by Freedom House. The 
openness variable is 야le ratio of exports plus imp야ts to GDP less 
the estimated effect on this ratio from the logs of popula디on and 
area. These effects were estimated in a panel system in which the 
dependent variable was the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
over various periods. The mean value of the openness variable was 
normalized to zero in each period. The terms-of-trade variable is the 
growth rate of the ratio of expoπ to import prices. 
The variable we use is a dυmmy for whether a b없lking crisis 
occurred for each country during any five-year period. 끼Te again 
considered the contemporaneous and lagged effects of these crises 
on economic gro\\πh and investment. 
The results from adding the currency-crisis and banking-crisis 
variables to the systems for economic growth are in Table 5. In 
column 1. a contemporaneous currency crisis (occurring sometime 
within the applicable five-year period) is associated with lower per 
capita growth ~ by 0.9 percent per year. This effect is statistically 
significant. 
Column 2 adds a lagged effect of a currency crisis. The result 
shows that the contraction of growth does not persist into the next 
five-year period. The estimated contemporaneous effect is signi“ 
cantly nega디ve and quan디tatively similar to that in column 1 
However. the lagged effect is positive. The estimated coefficient on 
the lagged currency crisis variable 1s statistically significant: 0.006 
(0.003). Hence , there is evidence that GDP growth rate tends to 
rebound by about 0.6 of a percentage point per year in the 
subsequent five-year period. 
Column 3 shows that the corresponding effect for a banking 
crisis is a retardation of growth by 0.8 percent per year. This effect 
is statistìcally significant. In column 4 , a lagged ban찌ng crisìs 
variable is added. The result also shows that the contraction of 
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TABLE 5 
IMPACT OF CURRENCY- AND B ANKlNG-CR1SES ON GROWl‘H RATES 
Explanatory variables 
Log (per caplta GDP) 
Log (lola l fertilHy rale) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-0 .0287 -0.0276 -0 .0270 -0.0274 -0.0290 -0.0281 
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.003~1) 
-0 .0159 -0 .016 1 -0 .0177 -0.0171 -0.0164 -0 .0 15!’ 
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.006찌 
Ma le u ppcr-level schooling 0 ‘ 0035 0.0035 0.0026 0 .0028 0 .0033 0.003ι 









(0.00 18) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.001 히 
0 .0721 0 .0634 0 .0662 0 .0666 0 .0719 0 .0641 
(0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0227) 10.0226) 10.0229) (0.022S') 
-0 .010 -0 .106 -0.093 -0.092 -0. 100 -0 . 100 
(0 .027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
0 .0 171 0.0156 0.0172 0 .0 185 0 .0175 0 .0174 
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0081) 
-0 .0058 -0 .0084 -0 ‘ 0164 -0.0 157 -0.0047 -0.007(; 
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0082) (0.0082) 
0.0437 0 .0420 0 .0425 0 .0439 0 .0419 0.0427 
(0.0205) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0199) 
-0.0274 -0 .0259 -0.0279 -0 .0293 -0 .0257 -0 .026E; 
{0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0 188) (0.0188) (0.0184) 
0 .0 120 0 .0124 0 .0104 0.0104 0 .0116 0.0 118 
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.00471 
lnveSlmenl/GDP 0.058 0 .064 0 .071 0 .074 0 .068 0 .076 
(0.032) (0.032) 10.032) (0.032) (0 .032) 10.032) 
GrowÚ1 ra l.e of lerms of 0 .059 0.054 0 .05 1 0.054 0 .055 0 .053 
lrade (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Contemporaneous 
cu rrency crisls 
Lagged currency crisis 
Conlemporaneous 
bank.ing cris ls 
Iιagged bank.lng crisls 
Number of counlrles 
。bservations




0 .006 1 
(0 ‘ 0026) 
85 
396 
-0 .0086 -0.0080 
(0 .0031) (0.0030 
0 .0057 
{0.0025: 
-0.0077 -0 .0079 -0 .0076 -0.0073 













Notes: The dependent variable 1s the growth rate of re aI per capita GDP. 
The g rowth rate i8 the average for each of the five fìve-year periods 
1975-80. 1980-5. ... 1995-2000. The earlie r periods w e re deleted 
because of missing data on the currency-crisis and b없lking-crisiS 
variables. The cuπency c risis i8 defìned by combining t\νo crileria. A 
currency crIsis is judge d to occur in the year when a country 
experie n ced a norninaI currency depreciation of at Ieast 25 percer t 
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in any quarter of a specific year and the depreciation rate exceeded 
that in the pre띠ous qu하ter by a margín of at least a 10 percent. A 
currency crísis is also identified at the month of a year when an 
indicator of currency pressure. a weighted average of monthly 
nomina1 exchange depreciatíon and monthly foreign reseπe loss. 
exceeds three standard deviations above the mean of the indicator 
over the sample períod for each countrγ， provided that eíther the 
monthly nomínal depreciation rate or percentage change of reseπe 
loss exceeds 5 percent. A crísis that is not apart at least 3 years 
from the nearest crísis is counted as a contínuatíon of the initial 
crísis rather than an independent crisis. The b없lking-crísis dummy 
varíable equals one íf at least one of the years ín the five-year 
period features a banking crisis , as defined in Caprío and Klingebiel 
(1996). Data on banking críses are compiled from Caprío and 
Klingebiel (1 996). Demir밍lC 밍ld Detragiache (1998) , 없ld Glick 밍ld 
Hutchison (2001). See the text for further details ‘ See the notes to 
Table 1 for additíonal informatíon. 
growth does not persist into the next five-year period. The esti-
mated coefficient here is again posi디ve but statistically insignificant: 
0.004 (0.003) ‘ 16 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 include both currency and ban찌ng 
crises variables together. In column 5 , the contemporaneous effects 
from currency and ban때ng crises are negative and statistically 
significant. The difference between the two effects from currency 
and ban퍼ng crises is not statistically significant • the p-value is 
0.78. Thus , currency and ban퍼ng crises seem to have quan디ta­
tively similar impacts on economic growth. 
The broad cross-country analysis indicates that a combination of 
a currency and a ban굉ng crisis would be associated with reduced 
growth contemporaneously by about 2 percent per year. From this 
16Additional persistence would be implied through effects on the 
independent variables. For example, the reduced level of per capita GDP 
provides a channel whereby a cuπency or ban퍼ng crisis would raise growth 
in the next períod. These effects tend , however, to be sma11. Negative , but 
quantitatively even smaller, effects involve the persisting influences on 
investment. Other negative effects on subsequent gro따h would arise if. as 
examples , a currency or banking crísis reduces intemationa1 trade or 
damages institutions that influence the rule of law. It is also possible that 
the occurrence of a currency or banking crisis alters the probability of a 
crísis in subsequent periods and thereby affects the expecta디on of future 
growth rates through those channels. These effects have not been 
investigated 
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TABLE 6 
IMPACT OF CURRENCY- AND BANKlNG-CRISES ON lNVESTMENT RATI0S 
Expl하latory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
’..agged raUo lo 0.631 0 .626 0.622 0 .607 0.626 0 .610 
invesLmenl to GDP (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Log (per capila GDP) -0 .0087 -0 .0086 -0 .0073 -0 .0068 -0.0086 -0 .008E 
(0.0046) (0.003 7) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (000481 
lιog (lotal ferUlily rale) -0.0210 -0.0212 -0.0208 -0.0227 -0.0209 -0 .02213 
(0.0070) (0.007 1) (0.007 1) (0.0073) (0.0071) (000731 
Male upper-Ievel schooling 0.0041 0.0039 0.0038 0 .0034 0.0040 0.0037 
(0.0019) [0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) [0.0019) (000201 
Log (life expeclancy) 0.066 0 .Oß7 0.067 0.068 0.066 0 .069 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Govemmenl 
consumpûon/GDP 
-0.117 -0.119 -0.125 -0.132 -0 .121 -0.129 





































































































 Democracy index -0 .0058 -0.0066 -0.0 109 -0.0122 -0 .0055 -0.0083 
(0.0249) [0.0249) [0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.02481 
Democracy index Squared 0.0090 0.0103 0.0124 0 .0140 0.0091 0.0125 
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0 . 02~101 
Openness measure 0 .0234 0 .0235 0.0236 0.0241 0 .0234 0.0240 
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.005 11 
Growt.h raLe of terms of 0.064 0 .062 0.053 0.043 0 .057 0 .049 
trade [0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Lagged currency cπsis 











banking cris is 
-0 .0068 -00063 -0.0062 -0 .006:<. 













l‘ agged banking crisls 






Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of reaJ investmenl (private plus 
public) to reaJ GDP. The investment ratio is the average for each of 
the five five-year periods 1975-9. 1980-4. ... 1995-9. The earli,er 
periods were deleted because of mìssing data on the currency-cris is 
andb밍lking-crisis variables. See the text for further details. S ee 디le 
notes to Tables 2 and 5 for additionaJ ìnfOlm a tion. 
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perspec디ve. the recent economíc contractions in the Asian-crisis 
countries look similar to the broader historical experience. In those 
cases. ref1ected in the dummy variables contained in Table 1. 
gro"πh rates for 1995-2000 were reduced by about 2 percent per 
year. 
Table 5 presents the results from adding the currency-crisis and 
ban퍼ng-crisis variables to the systems for the investment ratio. 
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that a currency crisis is associated 
with a statistically significant reduction by about 0.8 of a percent-
age point. In column 2. the estimated lagged effect of a currency 
crisis on investment is nega디ve but statistically insignificant. 
Hence. the investment contraction due to a currency crisis does not 
seem to persist into the ne.xt five-year period. 
Column 3 shows that a banking crisis is associated with a 
decrease in the investment ratio by 0.9 of a percentage point. and 
this result is statistically significant. Column 4 of Table 5 shows 
that the lagged effect from a banking crisis is a significantly 
nega디ve 0.8 of a percentage point. This finding contrasts with the 
statistically insignificant effect from a currency crisis on the 
investment ratio. Hence. a ban퍼ng crisis seems to have a 
persisting negative effect on investment. although such a crisis does 
not appear to have a persisting negative in f1uence on economic 
gro"πh (for given values of the investment ratio and other 
variables) . 
Column 5 shows that when currency and banking crises 
variables are included simultaneously. there are signific려1t nega디ve 
effects from currency and ban퍼ng crises on investment in the 
contemporaneous pe디od. 깐le difference between the two contem-
poraneous effects from currency and banking crises is not 
statistically significant - the p-value is 0.84. Thus. currency and 
banking crises have quan디tatively similar impacts on investment as 
well as economic gro"πh. 
From the perspective of the broad cross-country analysis. the 
sharp contractions of investment in the Asian-crisis countries in 
1998 were not exceptional. In the Asian -crisis cases. re f1ected in 
the dummy variab1es in Tab1e 2. average investment ratios for 
1995-2000 decreased by about 2 percentage points. The broader 
analysis also suggests that a combined currency and banking crisis 
would typically have been accompanied by a contraction of the 
investment ratio by about 2 percentage points. 
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IV. Conc:luding Remarks 
The Asian financìal crìsìs was assocìated wìth a sharp reductìon 
of economìc growth ìn East Asìa. especìally in the fìve countries 
that were most directly affected by the crisis. Investment ratios al:3o 
fell sharply in these crisìs countries. though not so much in other 
east Asìan economìes. Rates of economic gro\\πh in East Asia have 
rebounded ìn 1999-2002. but the permanence of thìs recovery is 
uncertaìn. The faìlure of ìnvestment ratios to rebound sìgnìficanlly 
ìn the crisis countries suggests that the crisis had a long-term 
adverse effect. This conclusìon is reìnforced by the observation that 
real stock-market prìces ìn the crìsìs countrìes have failed to 
reattaìn theìr pre-crìsis values. 
A simi1ar picture emerges from a broader study of currency and 
banking crises. This analysis documents the association of currency 
and banking crises wìth contemporaneously reduced values of 
economic growth and investment. The magnitude of the typical 
effect is quan디ta디vely similar to that seen in the recent period m 
the Asian crìsis countrìes. More importantly. the broader evìdence 
does not indicate a persisting adverse influence of currency and 
banking crises on economic growth. Thus. if extrapolated to the 
Asian-cri성is countries. the broad evidence predicts returns 1:0 the 
rates of economic growth that would have prevaìled in the absence 
of the crisis. However. the broader international evìdence shows 
some indication of a persisting adverse effect of a ban성ng crìsis ün 
ìnvestment. Consequently. throu당:h the permanent depressìon of 
investment. the financial crisis would have a long-term adver“e 
effect on growth in East Asia. 
(Received 29 October 2003: Revised 11 December 2003) 
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